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When We Cannot Deport, Is It Fair to Detain?: An
Analysis of the Rights of Deportable Aliens Under
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and the 1999 INS Interim
Procedures Governing Detention
I. INTRODUCTION
As one author wrote, “America has been a nation of immigrants
from the start.”1 Indeed, for many years in its early history and still
today, “[t]he United States [has been] a strong magnet for immigrants, offering them chances to take up farms in the country or jobs
in the cities.”2 In fact, between the years of 1820 and 1990, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) recorded the entry of
more than one hundred and twelve million immigrants into the
United States.3 Though many of these aliens welcomed to the
United States gain citizenship and live productive lives after their arrival, some do not.
One individual who has not led a productive life since coming to
the United States is Kestutis Zadvydas. Zadvydas, an immigrant from
Germany, came to the United States in 1956, at the age of eight,
and shortly thereafter began building an extensive criminal record.4
During his first twenty years in the United States, Zadvydas was convicted of two serious offenses—attempted robbery and attempted
burglary—as well as a number of less serious offenses.5 Based on
these two convictions, the INS initiated deportation proceedings in
1977, but shortly before he was to appear in front of an immigration
judge in 1982, Zadvydas disappeared.6

1. 1 GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 278 (3d ed.
1992).
2. Id. at 461.
3. See id. at A36–37.
4. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1999). Though Zadvydas
was given permanent resident status after his arrival, he never became a citizen of the United
States. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
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For the next five years, the INS was unable to find him. Then, in
1987, he was arrested in Virginia for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute but went into hiding again after jumping bail.7 It
was not until 1992, when Zadvydas voluntarily turned himself over
to authorities in Texas, then the INS was able to discover his whereabouts and take him into custody.8 He was tried and convicted on
the 1987 narcotics distribution charge and was sentenced to sixteen
years in prison with six years suspended; Zadvydas served two years
before he was released on parole.9 Shortly after his release, the INS
took him into custody and reinitiated deportation proceedings. In
March of 1994, an immigration judge, based on Zadvydas’ history of
flight, ordered that he be detained without bond during deportation
proceedings.10 He has been in INS custody since that time and for
the past six years has been awaiting deportation.11
In many cases, the deportation of aliens is effected within a short
period of time—most aliens are deported within just a few months of
the entry of a final deportation order. However, not all aliens are easily deported. One such alien is Zadvydas, who, due to circumstances
clearly beyond his control, is essentially “stateless” and thus has no
country to which he can be deported.12 Another is Kim Ho Ma,
“who left his native land, Cambodia, as a refugee at the age of two
and has resided in the United States as a legal permanent resident
since he was six.”13 In 1997, as a result of his participation in a gangrelated shooting and a subsequent conviction for manslaughter, the
INS began deportation proceedings against Ma. However, because
the United States has no repatriation agreement with Cambodia, Ma
is also undeportable.14 A number of other countries, such as Laos
and Vietnam, also have no signed repatriation agreements with the

7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. For more on Kestutis Zadvydas’s story, see Pamela Coyle, Ex-Cons Without Country
in Limbo, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 6, 1999, at A1.
12. For an explanation of the reason that Zadvydas is “stateless,” see Underdown, 185
F.3d at 291–94.
13. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 2000).
14. See id. A repatriation agreement is essentially an agreement that allows each country
party to the agreement to return to the other country its lawful citizens.
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United States; so aliens arriving from those countries similarly cannot
be deported.15
The problem that arises in situations such as Ma’s and Zadvydas’s involves a decision of what to do with these unwanted yet undeportable aliens. Because the United States has no repatriation
agreement with their respective nations, deportation is highly
unlikely. Yet many of these aliens have extensive criminal records and
are considered either dangers to the community, high risks of
flight—meaning it is unlikely that, if ordered deported and then released, they will voluntarily stay in contact with the INS until deportation is made possible—or both.16 To protect the public from potential recidivism or, in the alternative, to make sure the alien
ordered deported does not abscond, those aliens ordered deported
who are found to be dangerous or flight risks are physically detained
by the INS in local, state, or federal prisons. This detention, however, is problematic, for what arises in these situations is the possibility of indefinite detention—criminal aliens potentially being detained
for life because they cannot be deported and the INS does not want
to release them into the community. According to some, there are
over 2,800 such “lifers” now in INS custody.17
On a legal level, the problem that arises in these situations involves a clash of two important parts of the United States Constitution.18 On the one hand, Article I of the Constitution gives Congress
the power to exclude aliens and determine who is welcome within
the borders of the United States—Congress has the power to “estab15. See id. at 818 n.1.
16. “[O]ne Justice Department report concluded that 90 percent of aliens released from
custody abscond.” Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1999).
17. See Mike Clary & Patrick J. McDonnell, Sentenced to a Life in Limbo, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 1998, at A1; see also Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1151 (W.D. Wash. 1999)
(“More than one hundred habeas corpus petitions are currently pending in the Western District of Washington wherein aliens ordered deported to countries that have refused them admittance challenge the legality of their continued detention by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).”). For more information on the problems facing both the INS and those
aliens being detained pending deportation, see Dan Malone, INS Faulted in Extended Detentions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 12, 1999, at 1A. For the story of another alien currently
awaiting an unlikely deportation in prison, see Mark Bixler, When Jail Becomes Limbo,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 9, 2000, at 1D.
18. As one court put it, “[s]erious conflicts between policy and constitutional concerns
are presented by criminal aliens whose countries of origin refuse to repatriate them. Congress’
measures to insulate the community from potentially dangerous criminal aliens via lengthy detention have the potential to violate due process. Yet alternatives to incarceration have problems as well.” Chi Thon Ngo, 192 F.3d at 395.
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lish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . throughout the United
States.”19 On the other hand, the Fifth Amendment provides a guarantee of freedom from detention in that “[n]o person shall be . . .
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process.”20 In practical terms, the United States Congress has the power to exclude
unwanted aliens such as Zadvydas. Yet, when such an alien cannot be
deported—as Zadvydas cannot—questions arise. Does the United
States have to respect the alien’s presence in the United States and,
in contravention of Article I, let that person remain in our country?
Or can the United States, under the power given it by the Constitution to control its borders, hold an unwanted alien in custody until
he or she can be deported? Finally, if the United States does have the
power to detain an alien, but deportation cannot ever be effected,
can they detain that alien indefinitely without violating the alien’s
right to due process? These questions have only recently begun to be
addressed by the federal courts, which, without direct guidance from
the Supreme Court, have provided a wide-ranging panoply of answers to the above questions.
This Comment will attempt to address the clash between these
two parts of the Constitution and the important legal questions that
a situation such as Zadvydas’s causes to arise. Part II of this Comment addresses the background of immigration law, due process, and
the Attorney General’s statutory authority to detain aliens. Part III
analyzes the differing views of the courts that have ruled on the issues presented above. Part IV analyzes the arguments set forth by
the various courts and proposes that, in cases of potential indefinite
detention, courts should permit long-term detention of unwanted
criminal aliens when releasing them would be disadvantageous to the
community, even if that detention becomes indefinite. Finally, this
Comment concludes with Part V, a concise summary of the policies,
issues, and answers presented herein.
II. BACKGROUND
Under Article I of the United States Constitution, Congress has
the power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . .

19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V. As courts have made clear, the Fifth Amendment refers to
the protection of “persons” and not just “citizens.”
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throughout the United States.”21 This provision has generally been
interpreted to mean that Congress can determine which immigrants
and aliens should be permitted to enter and remain in the United
States.22 The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process,”23
which, in one respect, dictates that deprivations of physical liberty
should only be permitted when the government has a compelling
and narrowly tailored interest that supports it. To understand the
way in which these provisions clash in alien-detention situations, a
general understanding of immigration law and due process is required.
A. Immigration Law
Much has been written about the law of immigration, a subject
so vast that volumes have been dedicated to its study. This Comment
addresses only one sphere of immigration law—that of the detention
of unwanted deportable aliens. However, in order to understand the
issues presented and analyzed in this Comment, as well as the arguments and decisions in the cases discussed herein, one must be familiar with the basics of Congress’s plenary power in the immigration
law arena, its right to determine which aliens will be allowed to enter
and remain in the United States, and the difference between excludable and deportable aliens.
1. Congress’s plenary power in immigration law
Congress has a very significant, almost unchecked, power over
immigration—a power often referred to as its plenary power. In addressing Congress’s power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” the United States Supreme Court has held that “[t]he
exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty . . . inherent in
the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation.”24
The power to exclude aliens “is identical regardless of whether the
government seeks to exclude an alien who has not entered [the
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
22. See generally infra Parts II.A.1 and II.A.2. See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792
(1977).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
24. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); see also The
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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country], or to expel an alien who has resided” within the borders of
the United States for an extended period of time.25 Additionally,
“courts have long recognized that the governmental power to exclude or expel aliens may restrict aliens’ constitutional rights when
the two come into direct conflict.”26
Generally vested only in the legislative and executive branches,
this power “to expel or exclude aliens [is also] . . . largely immune
from judicial control.”27 As such, “[t]he power of the national government to act in the immigration sphere is thus essentially plenary.”28 In fact, the Supreme Court has even stated that “over no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete.”29
2. The right to accept or exclude aliens
The plenary power gives Congress the right to determine which
foreign-born persons are welcome within the borders of the United
States, as well as the right to determine which foreign-born individuals are not welcome. With respect to allowing persons born outside
of the country to become citizens of the United States, Congress has

25. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 288 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (“The right of a nation to expel or deport
foreigners, who have not been naturalized . . . is as absolute and unqualified, as the right to
prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country.”).
26. Underdown, 185 F.3d at 289; see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976)
(“In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753 (1972); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904).
27. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)). Judicial deference to the political branches of the government on immigration matters serves a number of purposes. For example, judicial deference
“allows for greater flexibility to adjust policy choices to changing political and economic circumstances” and further “allows the political branches to ‘exercise especially sensitive political
functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.’” Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149,
1155 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (citations omitted)).
28. Underdown, 185 F.3d at 289; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305–06
(1993).
29. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214
U.S. 320, 339 (1909)). Though the legislature has great power over the area of immigration,
the plenary power is subject to limitation in that it must be exercised in a manner that furthers
a legitimate governmental purpose.
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adopted a series of rules for a process termed naturalization.30 On
this subject, the Supreme Court wrote that Congress has the power
“to prescribe the terms and conditions on which [aliens] come in,”31
and it is only after full compliance with the terms set by Congress
does the privilege of gaining citizenship become a right.32
With respect to determining which aliens should not be allowed
to enter the United States or remain once they have entered, Congress has a number of options. First, a naturalized citizen is not necessarily guaranteed citizenship for life. In some circumstances, a
naturalized citizen is subject to having his or her citizenship revoked.33 Second, in addition to its power to denaturalize naturalized
aliens, Congress has the absolute power to exclude unwanted aliens
before naturalization occurs, regardless of how long a particular alien
may have resided in the United States. Regarding this power, the
Supreme Court wrote:
That the government of the United States, through the action of
the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a
proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not
exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of
another power. . . . “The United States, in their relation to foreign
countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation, invested
with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of
which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory.”34

30. The Supreme Court has defined naturalization as “the act of adopting a foreigner,
and clothing him with the privileges of a native citizen.” Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143
U.S. 135, 162 (1892). Gaining citizenship through naturalization is a privilege, and as such
Congress has a right to set the terms that a person must meet to acquire that privilege. One
such term requires that applicants for citizenship be of “good moral character.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1427(a)(3) (1994). Convicted felons are statutorily deemed to not be of good moral character. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(4) and (5) (1994).
31. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 335 (1909); see also The
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889).
32. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 615 (1931).
33. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481–1489 (1994); see also Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265
(1961); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946); Johannessen v. United States, 225
U.S. 227 (1912).
34. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603–04 (1889) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 413 (1821)); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585
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The history of American law is replete with legislation regulating
and restricting immigration into the United States.35 The first act of
Congress aimed at excluding unwanted aliens from the United States
was the Alien Act of 1798, which sanctioned the exclusion of any
alien that the President deemed dangerous.36 Almost a century later,
in 1875, Congress enacted legislation which barred convicts and
prostitutes from immigrating to and residing in the United States.37
Other grounds for exclusion were codified shortly thereafter.38 Some
of these additional exclusion-permitting laws included the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882,39 and quota-based immigration legislation.40
Today, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”),
with certain revisions made throughout the years, governs the
deportability of aliens.41 The INA contains a list of classes of aliens
that can be removed from the United States.42 Though Congress has
set forth the basis for exclusion or deportation in the INA—a right
guaranteed it by the Constitution—the courts, subject to the deference granted by the plenary power, remain free to interpret that statute and review its administration by governmental entities.43
3. Excludable aliens versus deportable aliens
Immigration law differentiates between at least two different
types of aliens in the deportation or removal context. The first, generally termed excludable or inadmissible aliens, are those aliens ineli-

(1913); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893).
35. See generally THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS
AND INTERPRETATION (Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello eds., 1996).
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. These exclusions included: “idiots, lunatics, convicts, and persons likely to
become public charges” (1882); “cheap foreign labor” (1885); “persons suffering from certain
diseases, those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, paupers, and polygamists”
(1891); “epileptics, insane persons, professional beggars, and anarchists” (1903); “feebleminded, children unaccompanied by parents, persons suffering with tuberculosis, and women
coming to the United States for prostitution or other immoral purposes” (1907). Id. at 277
n.1202.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1525 (1994).
42. See id. at § 1182.
43. See INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966).
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gible for admission into the United States.44 The second type, generally referred to as deportable aliens, are those who have gained admission to the United States as resident aliens but have not, at the
time of deportation, qualified for naturalization.45 Though this
Comment addresses the indefinite detention of deportable aliens,
understanding the nature of excludable aliens and their rights is important: many of the courts’ rulings on the issue of the detention of
deportable aliens followed an examination of cases dealing with the
indefinite detention of excludable aliens.46
B. The Right to Due Process of Law
To understand the controversy that arises in cases involving the
continued detention of deportable aliens, one must also understand

44. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (defining which aliens are deemed excludable). Though these
aliens are considered ineligible for admission into the United States, many of them are nevertheless allowed to remain in the United States pending deportation to their countries of origin.
Though these aliens “may physically be allowed within [the] borders [of the United States]
pending a determination of admissibility, [they] are legally considered to be detained at the
border and hence as never having effected entry into this country.” Gisbert v. United States
Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1440 (5th Cir. 1993). This situation is commonly referred to
as the “entry fiction.” Id.; see also Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir.
1995) (en banc).
The Supreme Court summarized the history of the entry fiction in Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). The Court wrote:
Aliens seeking entry from contiguous lands obviously can be turned back at the border without more. While the Government might keep entrants by sea aboard the
vessel pending determination of their admissibility, resulting hardships to the alien
and inconvenience to the carrier persuaded Congress to adopt a more generous
course. By statute it authorized . . . aliens’ temporary removal from ship to shore.
But such temporary harborage, an act of legislative grace, bestows no additional
rights. Congress meticulously specified that such shelter ashore “shall not be considered a landing” nor relieve the vessel of the duty to transport back the alien if ultimately excluded. And this Court has long considered such temporary arrangements
as not affecting an alien’s status; he is treated as if stopped at the border.
Id. at 215 (citations omitted).
45. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (defining which aliens are deemed deportable).
46. With respect to excludable aliens, the general consensus of the courts is that these
aliens can, without a violation of their constitutional rights, be detained indefinitely pending
deportation. See Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. at 215 (1953) (“[W]e do not think that respondent’s
exclusion deprives him of any statutory or constitutional right.”); Gisbert, 988 F.2d at 1442
(“We hold that the continued INS detention of prisoners is not punishment and does not constitute a violation of the aliens’ rights to substantive due process.”); see also Chi Thon Ngo v.
INS, 192 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 1999); Guzman v. Tippy, 130 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 1997); BarreraEchavarria, 44 F.3d at 1441. But see Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th
Cir. 1981).
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the guarantee of due process of law set forth in the Constitution, as
it relates to both United States citizens and foreign-born aliens.
1. Due process—generally
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution prohibit the deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”47 Due process analysis has two parts or components: substantive due process and procedural due process.48
a. Substantive due process. In general, “[s]ubstantive due process
prevents the Government from interfering with rights implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty or engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the
conscience.’”49 Further, substantive due process “forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no
matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”50 One such fundamental liberty interest is that of being free from physical detention.51
“When substantive due process rights are properly invoked, they
guard against certain government intrusions into the private sphere
regardless of the fairness of the process employed by the government.”52
b. Procedural due process. The second component of due process,
termed procedural due process, “ensures that government action depriving a person of life, liberty or property is implemented in a fair
manner.”53 As one would expect, “[t]he constitutional sufficiency of
procedures provided in any situation . . . varies with the circum-

47. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
48. “Substantive and procedural due process claims must be supported by an underlying
liberty interest. A liberty interest can arise in one of two ways: (1) from the Due Process Clause
itself; or (2) from a state or federal statute.” Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1058 (10th Cir.
2000) (citations omitted). Any analysis of due process claims must necessarily start with a
“careful description of the asserted right.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
49. Cholak v. United States, No. 98–365, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7424, at *17 (E.D.
La. May 18, 1998) (citation omitted); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25
(1937).
50. Flores, 507 U.S. at 301–02 (emphasis in original).
51. See Ho, 204 F.3d at 1062 (“Liberty is one of those basic rights enjoyed by all ‘persons,’ as ‘[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause.’” (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)) (dissenting opinion).
52. Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148, 157 (D.R.I. 1999).
53. Cholak, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7424, at *17–18.
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stances.”54 In determining whether a particular procedure affords an
individual procedural due process,
[a] Court must review the existing procedural framework, then
consider “the interest at stake for the individual, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used as
well as the probable value of additional or different procedural
safeguards, and the interest of the government in using the current
procedures.”55

When the procedures implemented by government to restrict a person’s liberty are unfair, a court will strike those procedures down as a
violation of the right to procedural due process. With respect to restrictions on physical liberty, whenever any person is to be detained
for any reason, both elements of due process must be met. Otherwise, the detention is unconstitutional.56
2. Due process—aliens
Aliens can claim some constitutional protections. Under Supreme Court jurisprudence, all persons within the territory of the
United States are entitled to due process of law, including aliens.57
Indeed, “[a]liens, both legal and illegal, are entitled to due process.”58 An alien’s right to due process of law is the most significant
check on the executive branch’s plenary power over aliens.59 But
while aliens are entitled to the protections of the Due Process
Clause, it is clear that they do “not enjoy the full panoply of rights
enjoyed by United States citizens.”60 Indeed, “Congress regularly
makes rules [for non-citizen aliens] that would be unacceptable if
54. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (citing Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv.,
452 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1981)).
55. Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (quoting Plasencia,
459 U.S. at 34 (1982)).
56. See infra Part II.C.2.
57. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); see also United States v.
Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671 (1998); Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32–33; Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953).
58. Cholak, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7424, at *18 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,
77 (1976); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982)).
59. See Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148, 156 (D.R.I. 1999) (“[T]he
power of executive branch officers to detain aliens pending deportation pursuant to a statutory
grant of authority is not without limits. This power, like most powers of government, is subject
to the counter-weight of due process.”).
60. Id.
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applied to citizens.”61 The issue that courts must face, and on which
they often differ in the deportation context, is the specific nature of
the rights belonging to excludable, resident, and deportable aliens
respectively.
a. Rights of excludable aliens. Under the “entry fiction,”62 excludable aliens “are legally considered to be detained at the border and
are thus not entitled to due process protection.”63 As such, “the Due
Process Clause affords an excludable alien no procedural protection
beyond the procedure explicitly authorized by Congress, nor any
‘substantive right to be free from immigration detention.’”64 Indeed,
the long-term detention of excludable aliens pending deportation is
generally considered allowable.65
b. Rights of resident aliens. Resident aliens, or those who have
been admitted to the United States, have significantly more rights
than excludable aliens; for “[o]nce an alien gains admission to our
country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly.”66 This means
that resident aliens are, unlike excludable aliens, entitled to the due
process protections guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment,67 though
not to the extent enjoyed by full citizens of the United States.
c. Rights of deportable aliens. As the above discussion shows, it is
well-established that while excludable aliens have some constitutional
rights, those rights are fewer in number and lesser in degree than any
belonging to citizens of the United States. It is also generally accepted that resident aliens have more significant rights than excludable aliens, such that they are given protections of substantive and
procedural due process that excludable aliens are not given.68 The is61. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 80; see also Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (holding that a state can exclude resident aliens from basic government functions without violating
the Constitution).
62. See supra note 44.
63. Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1153 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (citing Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–33 (1982); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206 (1953); Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
64. Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1154 (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32
(1982)) (alteration in original).
65. See Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1448 (5th Cir. 1993).
66. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32.
67. See Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1061 (10th Cir. 2000) (dissenting opinion).
68. See Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32–33; Gisbert, 988 F.2d at 1442 n.8. The Supreme
Court has, in a number of cases, addressed the procedural due process rights guaranteed to
deportable aliens during the process of determining whether or not deportation is in order. See
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sue that arises—an issue on which the courts disagree—is the extent
of rights belonging to deportable aliens, or aliens who were once
resident aliens but have since been slated for deportation. Some
courts have held that these aliens retain all of the rights that they enjoyed as resident aliens until they are physically removed from the
country, while others feel that once an order of deportation is finalized, the rights that these aliens enjoyed as residents disappear.69
Again, this Comment will address this issue and the views of the respective courts that have addressed it.
C. Government Interest in Detention of Certain Persons
Also important for the purposes of this Comment are (1) the law
of the United States regarding detention; (2) the government’s interest in the detention of certain persons; and (3) the way in which
due process interacts with detention.
1. Government interest in detaining certain persons
As one court wrote, “[d]etention is a deprivation of liberty.”70
Indeed, “freedom from physical restraint ‘has always been at the core
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary
government action.’”71 “In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”72 This interest in freedom from restraint is not, however, sacrosanct and untouchable. The government can, so long as certain
requirements are met, detain individuals for the good of the nation,
even when no crime has been committed.73 For example, the govPlasencia, 459 U.S. at 32–33; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153–54 (1945); The Japanese
Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903). These cases do not, however, address the nature of an alien’s procedural due process rights following the actual entry of an order of deportation.
69. See infra Part III.B.1.
70. Nguyen v. Fasano, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1110 (S.D. Cal. 2000).
71. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
72. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
73. See Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148, 157 (D.R.I. 1999). Specifically, the government can only detain a person when that detention serves to meet a narrowly
tailored and compelling government interest. Additionally, the detention must not exceed the
scope of that narrowly tailored interest. See Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154–55
(W.D. Wash. 1999) (“[A] deprivation will comport with due process only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. . . . This requires the Court . . . to ask
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ernment has a regulatory interest in community safety and may, in
certain circumstances, “detain individuals whom the Government believes to be dangerous.”74 Further, when the government has an interest in securing an individual’s presence at a particular time and
place, detention may be appropriate when the person is unlikely to
appear as requested.75 In sum, whether detention is a violation of a
detainee’s constitutional rights depends, in large part, on the purpose of that detention.76
Courts have a duty to protect against unwarranted and unconstitutional detention. The Southern District of California described the
process courts use in making these determinations in Nguyen v.
Fasano:77
In detention cases, to determine whether a deprivation of liberty is
impermissible punishment or permissible regulation, the court must
examine whether the deprivation of liberty is imposed for the purpose of punishment or in furtherance of regulatory goals; and if in
furtherance of regulatory goals, whether the deprivation is excessive
in relation to the purpose for the deprivation.78

In the case of the detention of unwanted deportable aliens, courts
must decide if the detention “is excessive in relation to the

whether the detention is based upon ‘permissible’ regulatory goals of the government and, if it
is, whether the detention is excessive in relation to those goals.”) (citations omitted). See also
Vo v. Greene, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284 (D. Co. 1999) (“When determining whether detention serves a compelling government interest, [one] should first decide ‘whether the detention
is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is merely incidental to another legitimate governmental purpose.’” (quoting Gilbert v. United States Attorney General, 988 F.2d
1437, 1441 (5th Cir. 1993)).
74. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748. With respect to particular situations in which a person
deemed to be dangerous was permitted to be detained, see Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160
(1948). See also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 281 (1984) (permitting pre-trial detention of
juvenile delinquents considered to be dangerous); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537–42
(1952) (permitting the detention of potentially dangerous aliens pending deportation).
75. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1994) (“[I]f, after a hearing . . . the judicial officer finds
that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the
person as required . . . he shall order the detention of the person prior to trial.”). See also Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–40 (1979) (permitting the detention of an accused pending
trial where the accused presented a risk of flight).
76. Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1154–55 (“[T]he Court [is required] to consider the constitutionality of the detention in light of its purpose . . . .”); see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747
(“To determine whether a restriction on liberty constitutes impermissible punishment or permissible regulation, we must first look to legislative intent.”); Schall, 467 U.S. at 269.
77. 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2000).
78. Id. at 1110.
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purpose for the deprivation.”79 “Such a determination is highly dependent on the unique facts of each case.”80
2. Detention and due process
While the government does have an interest in detaining certain
persons, that detention can, at some point, become a violation of
due process, though it was not such a violation to begin with.81 As
one court wrote, “If a substantive due process violation is to be
found in the practice of detention . . . it can only be based upon a
finding that the detention under a particular set of factual circumstances is excessive in relation to the governmental purposes behind
the restriction in [a] particular context.”82
D. The Detention of Unwanted Aliens
It is a longstanding rule that “[t]he government’s interest in efficient administration of the immigration laws at the border . . . is
weighty.”83 As such, Congress has given the INS power to detain
aliens pending deportation.
1. The purpose of detaining aliens—generally
The purpose of detaining aliens is three-fold. First and foremost,
detention advances the government’s interest in “ensuring the re-

79. Id.; see also Schall, 467 U.S. at 269. In Phan v. Reno, the Western District of Washington expounded on this procedure, arguing that strict scrutiny review was required in these
cases. The court wrote:
As a general rule, government invasions of fundamental liberty interests are subject
to strict scrutiny review: a deprivation will comport with due process only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Applying this standard of
review in detention cases, courts consider whether the detention is “imposed for the
purpose of punishment or whether it is merely incidental to another legitimate governmental interest.” This requires the Court to consider the constitutionality of the
detention in light of its purpose, and to ask whether the detention is based upon
“permissible” regulatory goals of the government and, if it is, whether the detention
is excessive in relation to those goals.
Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1154–55 (quoting Gilbert v. United States Attorney General, 988
F.2d 1437, 1441 (5th Cir. 1993); see also In re Indefinite Detention Cases, 82 F. Supp. 2d
1098, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
80. Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148, 159 (D.R.I. 1999).
81. See id. at 158–59.
82. Id. at 159.
83. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).

1565

6DIN-FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/9/00 1:39 PM

[2000

moval of aliens ordered deported.”84 Second, “detention helps to
guarantee reliable and speedy deportation by preventing the alien
from absconding during the pendency of the deportation proceedings.”85 Third, with respect to aliens such as Zadvydas, the “detention of an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony furthers the government’s efforts to protect the community from
criminal behavior.”86 All three of these interests are legitimate and
satisfy the permissibility standard set forth by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Salerno,87 meaning they provide the government
with the legitimate interest necessary to impose detention on certain
persons.
2. Due process and the detention of aliens
Courts have agreed on the proposition that immigration detention is not punishment but “is merely an administrative incident to
the civil deportation process;”88 therefore, it does not violate due
process guarantees under the Constitution.89 That detention can,
however, become a violation if it ever goes beyond the interest that
the government has in detaining the alien.
With respect to the detention of aliens, “consideration of several
factors [has] been identified by federal courts as relevant to . . . an
examination”90 of whether due process has been violated in this

84. Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1155 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
85. Hermanowski, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 159 (citation omitted).
86. Id.
87. See Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. With respect to these regulatory goals, the Phan
Court wrote:
Clearly the government has a legitimate interest in securing the safe removal of
aliens. Indeed, this is a primary objective of the INS: to decide which aliens may remain in the United States and which must leave, and to facilitate the safe and expeditious removal of aliens ordered deported. The latter two goals are incidental to
this primary objective.
Id.
88. Hermanowski, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 158; see also Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F.2d
956, 962 (9th Cir. 1991); Tran v. Caplinger, 847 F. Supp. 469, 475 (W.D. La. 1993) (“Congress did not provide for detention of aliens convicted of aggravated felonies as a means of
punishment.”).
89. Immigration detention imposed for the purpose of punishment beyond that meted
out by the criminal courts is, without a doubt, a violation of due process. Hermanowski, 39 F.
Supp. 2d at 158.
90. Id. at 159.
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manner. These factors include the length of detention,91 the likelihood of deportation,92 the potential length of future detention, the
likelihood that release will serve to frustrate the actual deportation of
the alien, and the danger the specific alien poses to the community if
released.93 As one court addressing this subject wrote, in making a
due process determination, “we must necessarily balance the likelihood that the government will be able to effectuate deportation,
against the dangerousness of a petitioner and the likelihood that he
will abscond if released.”94
3. Detention of excludable aliens
Though the issue in cases such as Ma’s involves the potentially
indefinite detention of deportable aliens, courts have in the past addressed the issue of the prolonged detention of excludable aliens.95
Though the issue is different, understanding the case law regarding
the indefinite detention of excludable aliens is important because, in
making their decisions on detention of deportable aliens, courts have
looked to these earlier cases for guidance.
The seminal case in the area of the potentially indefinite detention of excludable aliens is Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei,96 a 1953 Supreme Court decision which dealt with the detention of “an alien immigrant permanently excluded from the United
States on security grounds but stranded in [a] temporary haven on
Ellis Island because other countries will not take him back.”97 In
Mezei, the alien in question was seeking a return to the United States
after having spent nineteen months behind the Iron Curtain.98 The
Korean War was in progress, and the United States was distrusting of
communism and communist-controlled nations. Mezei was seen as a
91. See Truong Thanh Tam v. INS, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1191–92 (E.D. Cal. 1998);
United States v. Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. 1011, 1026–27 (E.D. La. 1997).
92. See Trunng ThanhTam, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 1191–92; Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. at
1026–27; Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 793 (D. Kan. 1980).
93. See Hermanowski, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 159 (D.R.I. 1999).
94. Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
95. In review, deportable aliens are those who were at one time admitted into the
United States as permanent residents, but have since been ordered deported. Excludable aliens,
in contrast, are those aliens who the United States rejected at the border and deemed unworthy of permanent resident status.
96. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
97. Id. at 207.
98. See id. at 208.
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security risk; 99 therefore, the Supreme Court held that the continued
exclusion and detention of Mezei did not “deprive[] him of any
statutory or constitutional right.”100
Though Mezei has, by some courts, been distinguished on its
facts—it admittedly dealt with a unique situation—a number of more
recent cases have firmly entrenched in federal case law the rule set
forth in Mezei. For example, in Gisbert v. United States Attorney General,101 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “the continued
INS detention of [excludable aliens] is not punishment and does not
constitute a violation of the aliens’ rights to substantive due process.”102 Similarly, in Guzman v. Tippy,103 the Second Circuit stated
that the “[i]ndefinite detention of excludable aliens does not violate
due process.”104 And finally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
its ruling in Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison,105 stated that “[b]ecause
excludable aliens are deemed under the entry doctrine not to be present on United States territory, a holding that they have no substantive right to be free from immigration detention reasonably follows.”106
Again, though this Comment addresses the detention of deportable aliens and not excludable aliens, understanding the rule of Mezei
and its progeny is important because many courts have looked to
that rule to determine whether deportable aliens can be similarly detained without a violation of the Due Process Clause.
4. Detention of deportable aliens
Under the current system, the detention of deportable aliens is
permitted by statutory law. Prior to 1996, the former 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252 permitted the detention. The current law allowing detention
is found in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), which is supplemented by various
subsections of 8 C.F.R. § 241.
99. As one court distinguishing Mezei pointed out, “security risks and enemy aliens during wartime have always been treated specially.” Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d
1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981).
100. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215.
101. 988 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir. 1993).
102. Id. at 1442.
103. 130 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 1997).
104. Id. at 66.
105. 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995).
106. Id. at 1450.
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a. 8 U.S.C. § 1252: The prior law. Prior to 1996, aliens ordered
deported generally could not be detained pending that deportation
for a period of more than six months.107 “Upon expiration of the sixmonth period, such aliens had to be released, but they remained subject to the supervision of the Attorney General.”108
b. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a): The current law. In 1996, Congress altered the detention provisions of the INA when it enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (“IIRIRA”). The AEDPA amended 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) “to
require the Attorney General to take into custody aliens convicted of
aggravated felonies, controlled substance offenses, firearms offenses,
and other serious crimes upon the release of such aliens from incarceration.”109 The AEDPA also “required the Attorney General to detain such aliens pending their removal from the United States.”110
Section 1231 of Title 8 of the United States Code, enacted as a
part of the IIRIRA, deals with the post-1996 detention and removal
of aliens ordered removed by an immigration judge. Of specific importance to this Comment is subsection (a). Section 1231(a)(1) defines what is termed the “removal period.” Specifically, this section
requires that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, when an
alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the
alien from the United States within a period of 90 days.”111 Section
1231(a)(2) requires the Attorney General to detain all aliens during
that ninety-day period.112 Subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) address the
supervision of aliens released within the United States after the
107. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1994).
108. Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1151–52 (W.D. Wash. 1999). See former 8
U.S.C. § 1252(d) (1994).
109. Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1152.
110. Id.
111. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1).
112. “During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(2). With respect to § 1231(a)(1) and (2), the Underdown court interpreted the law
as follows:
Under . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1) & (2), the Attorney General is required to remove an alien from the United States within the “removal period,” defined generally as the ninety days beginning when an order of removal becomes administratively
final, when any judicial review thereof is completed, or when the alien is released
from confinement (other than under an immigration process), whichever is latest,
and is required to detain the alien during the removal period.
185 F.3d 279, 287 (5th Cir. 1999).
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ninety-day removal period and the removal of aliens imprisoned, arrested, or on parole, supervised release, or probation at the time removal is ordered, respectively. And subsection (a)(5) addresses the
reinstatement of removal orders against aliens who have illegally reentered the country.
For the purposes of this Comment, the most important and disputed portion of § 1231 is subsection (a)(6):
An alien ordered removed who is . . . removable under section
1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) . . . or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or
unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the
terms of supervision in paragraph (3).113

Clearly the language of § 1231(a)(6) explicitly permits detention beyond the ninety-day removal period for certain categories of aliens.114
The question that the courts have had difficulty and dissension addressing involves the permissible length of that post–removal period
detention and whether potentially indefinite detention under it
would constitute a violation of due process.
c. 8 C.F.R.. §§ 241.1–241.4. Part 241 of Title 8, Chapter I, of the
Code of Federal Regulations, which supplements 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a), addresses, among other things, the post-hearing detention and removal of aliens under the 1996 Act. Sections 241.1
through 241.4 are important with respect to the issues addressed in
this Comment.

113. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
114. The Ma court described the categories of aliens that can and cannot be removed. It
wrote:
Under the statute, aliens who cannot be removed at the end of ninety days fall into
two groups. Those in the first group must be released subject to supervisory regulations that require them, among other things, to appear regularly before an immigration officer, provide information to that official, notify INS of any change in their
employment or residence within 48 hours, submit to medical and psychiatric testing,
and comply with substantial restrictions on their travel. Those in the second group
“may be detained beyond the removal period” and, if released, shall be subject to the
same supervisory provisions applicable to aliens in the first group. Aliens in the second group include, among others, persons removable because of criminal convictions (such as drug offenses, certain crimes of moral turpitude, “aggravated felonies,” firearms offenses, and various other crimes).
Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 821 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227, 1231).
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Section 241.1 deals with final orders of removal and sets forth six
scenarios in which an order of removal made by an immigration
judge “at the conclusion of proceedings under section 240 of the
Act shall become final.”115 Section 241.2 addresses the procedures
for the issuance and execution of a warrant of removal. Section
241.3 addresses the issue of detention of aliens ordered deported
during the removal period. It states, in pertinent part, “[o]nce the
removal period defined in section 241(a)(1) of the Act begins, an
alien in the United States will be taken into custody pursuant to the
warrant of removal.”116
Most important for the purpose of this Comment, § 241.4 addresses the continued detention of aliens beyond the removal period
ordered deportation. This section provides:
(a) Continuation of custody for . . . criminal aliens. The district director may continue in custody any alien . . . removable under section 237(a)(1)(c), 237 (a)(2), or 237 (a)(4) of the Act, or who presents a significant risk of noncompliance with the order of removal,
beyond the removal period, as necessary, until removal from the
United States.117

Section 241 also provides a way for aliens who fit in any of the
above categories to acquire release when the ninety-day removal period expires. The burden of proving appropriate release is placed
upon the alien and not the government as it would be in a pre-trial
detention setting. In this respect, § 241.4 provides:
If such an alien demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that
the release would not pose a danger to the community or a significant flight risk, the district director may, in the exercise of discretion, order the alien released from custody on such conditions as
the district director may prescribe, including bond in an amount
sufficient to ensure the alien’s appearance for removal.118

115. 8 C.F.R. § 241.1 (2000).
116. 8 C.F.R. § 241.3. Section 236.1(d)(2)(ii) of 8 C.F.R. will allow the alien to “request review by the district director of the conditions of his or her release” after the order of
deportation does become finalized.
117. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4.
118. Id.

1571

6DIN-FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/9/00 1:39 PM

[2000

In determining whether an alien’s petition for release should be
granted, § 241.4 sets forth a non-exhaustive list of factors that he
district director may consider.119
d. Additional rules. On August 6, 1999, the INS announced additional interim procedures—beyond those contained in the aforementioned C.F.R. sections—related to the detention of aliens whose
deportation is unlikely during the ninety-day removal period.120
119. These factors include: (1) the nature and seriousness of the alien’s criminal convictions; (2) the alien’s entire criminal history; (3) the sentence(s) imposed for the conviction
leading to removal and the time actually served for the conviction; (4) the alien’s history of
failures to appear for court; (5) the alien’s probation history; (6) the nature of any disciplinary
problems that the alien posed while incarcerated; (7) any evidence of rehabilitative efforts or
recidivism on the part of the alien; (8) equities in the United States; and (9) the alien’s prior
immigration violations and history. See id.
120. The pertinent parts of these interim procedures, as set forth in their entirety in the
Appendix to Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 1999), are as follows:
(1) Pursuant to the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, the District Director will continue to conduct a custody review of administratively final order removal cases before
the ninety-day removal period mandated by section 241(a)(1) expires for aliens
whose departure cannot be effected within the removal period.
(2) These procedures apply to any alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under
section 212, removable under 237(a)(1)(C), 237(a)(2), or 237(a)(4) or who has
been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely
to comply with the order of removal. They cover aliens convicted of an aggravated
felony offense who are subject to the provisions of old INA section 236(e)(1)–(3),
and non-aggravated felon aliens with final orders of exclusion. . . . The ninety-day
review will be conducted pursuant to the instructions set out in the memoranda of
February 3 and April 30, 1999. District Directors may, in their discretion, interview
the alien if they believe that an interview would facilitate the custody review.
(3) Following expiration of the ninety-day removal period, the next scheduled review provided by the District Director shall be nine months from the date of the final administrative order of removal or six months after the last review, whichever is
later. Written notice shall be given to each alien at least 30 days prior to the date of
the review. . . . The notice shall specify the factors to be considered and explain that
the alien will be provided the opportunity to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that he is not a threat to the community and is likely to comply with the
removal order.
(4) For the review discussed in paragraph 3 above, an interview is mandatory and
the District Director’s preliminary decision will be subject to Headquarters review.
Thereafter, custody reviews will be conducted every six months, alternating between
District Director file reviews and a review that includes the opportunity for an interview at the alien’s request and a Headquarters review of detention decisions. . . .
The District Director has the discretion to schedule further interviews if he determines they would assist him in reaching a custody determination.
(5) The alien must be advised that he may submit any information relevant to support his request for release from detention, either in writing, electronically, by U.S.
mail (or any combination thereof), or in person if an interview is conducted. The
alien must also be advised that he may be represented by an attorney, or other per-
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In conjunction with that announcement, the INS also declared an
“intention to promulgate regulations to the same effect.”121
son at no expense to the government. If an interview has been scheduled, the alien’s
representative may attend the review at the scheduled time.
(6) The District Director may delegate custody decisions to the level of the Assistant
District Director, Deputy Assistant District Director, or those acting in their capacity. Custody determinations will be made by weighing favorable and adverse factors
to determine whether the detainee has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he does not pose a threat to the community, and is likely to comply with
the removal order. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. The alien’s past failure to cooperate in obtaining a travel document shall be considered an adverse factor in determining eligibility for release. See INA § 241(a)(1)(C) Suspension of Period. The fact that the
alien has a criminal history does not create a presumption in favor of continued detention.
(7) Within thirty days of the District Director’s custody review, the alien must receive written notification of a custody decision. . . . A decision to release should
specify the conditions of release. A decision to detain will clearly delineate the factors presented by the alien in support of his release, and the reasons for the District
Director’s decision.
(8) With respect to those detain decisions that are subject to Headquarters review
under paragraph 4, the District Director’s determination that the alien should be detained is to be regarded as only preliminary. In those instances, the Regional Directors will forward the preliminary detain decisions to Headquarters for review. Headquarters review will be conducted by Operations and Programs representatives (with
assistance from the Office of General Counsel as necessary). Where the Headquarters reviewer’s decision concurs with the District Director’s, the Headquarters reviewer will write a supporting statement and will seek concurrence from a second
Headquarters reviewer. Where the two reviewers differ, a panel of three Headquarters reviewers will conduct a further review of the case. The Headquarters panel may
ratify the District Director’s decision, return the case to the District Director to reconsider his decision, or determine that additional information is required to make a
decision. The Headquarters review must be completed within thirty days of file receipt. The Headquarters review conclusions will be forwarded to the Regional Director for distribution to and appropriate action by the District Director.
(9) The District Director will review his decision in light of the Headquarters recommendations and will notify the alien of the final custody determination within
thirty days of completion of the Headquarters review.
(10) The District Director should make every effort to effect the alien’s removal
both before and after expiration of the removal period. All steps to secure travel
documents must be fully documented in the alien’s file. However, if the District Director is unable to secure travel documents locally after making diligent efforts to do
so, then the case shall be referred to Headquarters OPS/DDP for assistance. More
detailed instructions will be issued from the Executive Associate Commissioner for
Operations by separate memorandum.
(11) On August 30, 1999, and on the last workday of each quarter (September, December, March, June) each district shall submit a custody review status report to its
Regional office and to Headquarters. There will be more detailed instructions issued
on reporting procedures at a later time.
Id. at 400–01.
121. Nguyen v. Fasano, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108 (S.D. Cal. 2000).
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These interim procedures were set forth by the INS shortly after
the publication of the Western District of Washington’s decision in
Phan v. Reno,122 which essentially held that the continued detention
of undeportable deportable aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) was,
in most cases, unconstitutional.123 The practical effect of Phan was
that the INS was required to release a large number of undeportable
detainees,124 and the interim procedures were promulgated to address the substantive and procedural due process concerns expressed
by the Phan court in an effort to stop the ordered release of so many
aliens. Other courts have addressed these issues as well.
III. THE CASES AND THE ISSUES THEY RAISE
As 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) is a fairly new statute, only a handful
of courts have addressed the issue of its constitutionality and otherwise interpreted the statute. These courts are split in their treatment
of § 1231(a)(6).
A. Views of the Courts on the Indefinite Detention of Aliens
The courts that have addressed the issue of indefinite detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) have expressed three different views on
the issue. The majority of courts, all federal district courts, have held
that the language of § 1231(a)(6) permits indefinite detention of
aliens, but such detention is a violation of the alien’s right of due
process and is therefore unconstitutional. A minority of courts, including two federal circuit courts, have held that the language of
§ 1231(a)(6) permits the indefinite detention of aliens and that prolonged detention under the statute is both lawful and constitutional.
Finally, two courts have invoked the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance and concluded that the language of § 1231(a)(6) does not
permit indefinite detention at all.

122. 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
123. For a limited look at reaction to the Phan ruling, see Alex Tizon, For INS, A Matter
of Time, SEATTLE TIMES, June 18, 1999, at B1; Patrick McMahon, Court Clarifies Rights of
Immigrant Ex-Cons, USA TODAY, July 12, 1999, at 7A.
124. See Mike Carter & Steve Miletich, Indefinite Detention by INS Is Illegal, SEATTLE
TIMES, July 10, 1999, at A1 (reporting that in Washington alone, the Phan ruling could ultimately force the INS “to release as many as 120 . . . criminal aliens,” as well as preclude the
prolonged detention of future criminal aliens ordered deported to countries with which the
United States has no repatriation agreement).
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1. Indefinite detention is permitted by § 1231(a)(6) but is a violation
of an alien’s right to due process
In the past three years, at least seven United States district courts
have held that while the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) explicitly
authorizes the indefinite detention of deportable aliens, such indefinite detention is a violation of those aliens’ due process rights.125 The
courts that have addressed the issue of indefinite detention under
§ 1231(a)(6) constitute the majority view.
One court that held indefinite detention of deportable aliens under the statute unconstitutional was the Western District of Washington in the aforementioned case of Phan v. Reno.126 Phan is a
unique case in that, though it was decided at the district court level,
it was presided over by a group of five district court judges sitting en
banc. Additionally, the five judges heard oral arguments not on one
case, but on five consolidated cases, and issued a joint order for those
five cases.127
After setting forth the general background for the case, the Phan
court addressed the statutory and regulatory framework of 8 U.S.C.
125. These courts are: Kay v. Reno, 94 F. Supp. 2d 546 (M.D. Pa. 2000); Nguyen v.
Fasano, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Sengchanh v. Lanier, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1356
(N.D. Ga. 2000); Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148 (D. R.I. 1999); Phan v.
Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Wash. 1999); Vo v. Greene, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D. Co.
1999); United States v. Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. 1011 (E.D. La. 1997). In addition to these
courts, in In re Indefinite Detention Cases, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2000), the Central
District of California held that indefinite detention of deportable aliens is unconstitutional
without specifically addressing whether § 1231(a)(6) permits that indefinite detention.
126. 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
127. In setting forth its reasoning for handling the cases as it did, the Phan court wrote
the following:
More than one hundred habeas corpus petitions are currently pending in the Western District of Washington wherein aliens ordered deported to countries that have
refused them admittance challenge the legality of their continued detention by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). In an order dated April 22, 1999,
the undersigned judges of the Western District designated five lead cases that present issues common to all petitioners and directed the parties to brief and argue
these common issues together; the remaining cases were stayed pending decisions in
the lead cases.
Id. The court later added:
Due to the great number of cases currently pending in this district that raise the
same issue, namely whether INS detention of aliens ordered deported to countries
that have refused them admittance violates substantive or procedural due process,
we recognize the need to adopt a consistent legal framework to guide our individual
consideration of these petitions.
Id.
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§ 1231(a) and its predecessor, and its accompanying C.F.R. sections.
Determining that § 1231(a)(6) did permit the potentially indefinite
detention of the aliens before it, the court then addressed the constitutionality of that detention under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. In concluding that indefinite detention under the
statute was unconstitutional, the Phan court wrote:
[A]s the probability that the government can actually deport an
alien decreases, the government’s interest in detaining that alien
becomes less compelling and the invasion into the alien’s liberty
more severe. Dangerousness and flight risk are thus permissible
considerations and may, in certain situations, warrant continued detention, but only if there is a realistic chance that an alien will be
deported. Detention by the INS can be lawful only in aid of deportation. Thus, it is “excessive” to detain an alien indefinitely if deportation will never occur.128

In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the INS’s argument that the procedures that it had in place at the time were adequate to provide the detained aliens with due process.129 The court
then promised to provide an “expedited review of the remaining petitions . . . stayed pursuant to the April 22nd and June 29th orders.”130
Another district court decision holding that indefinite detention
of deportable aliens is a violation of due process is Kay v. Reno,131 an
April 2000 decision handed down by the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Kay addressed the detention of Sombat Map Kay, a permanent resident born in Cambodia in 1974. Kay was arrested in 1992
for armed assault, armed robbery, and breaking and entering and was
ordered deported in 1996. Distinguishing a Third Circuit Court of

128. Id. at 1156.
129. See id. at 1157–58. The court also rejected an INS argument that the interest of the
petitioner aliens was “the right to be released into the United States pending [their] removal.”
In response to this argument, the court stated that the issue was “much more basic—it is simply the right to be at liberty.” Id. at 1154 (citation omitted). The INS also argued that in reviewing the petitioner’s cases, “the Court’s power to inquire into alleged violations of petitioners’ substantive due process rights is limited, and the Court should therefore apply a more
deferential standard of review.” Id. at 1155. The court disagreed, stating that “[w]hile the plenary power doctrine supports judicial deference to the legislative and executive branches on
substantive immigration matters, such deference does not extend to post-deportation order
detention.” Id. The court instead applied strict scrutiny.
130. Id. at 1158.
131. 94 F. Supp. 2d 546 (M.D. Pa. 2000).
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Appeals decision in which it was held that excludable aliens can be
detained indefinitely pending deportation,132 the Kay court determined that Kay was unlikely to be deported anytime soon and therefore was facing the possibility of indefinite detention.133 Focusing on
the holding in Phan and certain provisions of the Bail Reform Act,
which governs pre-trial detention, the court determined that the
government’s interest in detaining Kay was outweighed by both his
right to freedom from physical confinement and the potentially
lengthy duration of his confinement. Kay’s habeas corpus petition
was granted and the court ordered that, absent a showing that he
was likely to be removed in the foreseeable future, the INS must release Kay from confinement.134 The holdings in Phan and Kay are
representative of the decisions of the other courts that have held that
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) permits indefinite detention, but that such
detention is a violation of an alien’s right to due process.
2. Indefinite detention is permitted by § 1231(a)(6) and is not a
violation of an alien’s right to due process
While at least seven federal district courts have held that continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), though permissible under the statute, is unconstitutional, at least four courts, including
two federal appellate courts, have held otherwise.135 These courts
have held that § 1231(a)(6) does indeed permit indefinite detention
and that such detention is not a violation of an alien’s right to due
process.
The holding in Ho v. Greene136 is representative of the decisions
of these courts. In Ho, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
the habeas petitions of two aliens awaiting deportation in INS detention, one of whom was a permanent resident before being ordered
deported. Concluding that “[t]he final removal orders stripped both
[aliens] of any heightened constitutional status either may have pos-

132. See Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 1999).
133. See Kay, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 553.
134. See id. at 557.
135. These courts include: Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045 (10th Cir. 2000); Zadvydas v.
Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999); Villafuerte v. INS, 71 F. Supp. 2d 573 (W.D. La.
1999); and Cholak v. United States, No. 98–365, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7424 (E.D. La. May
18, 1998).
136. 204 F.3d 1045 (10th Cir. 2000).
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sessed prior to the entry of the final removal order,”137 the Ho court
wrote: “The applicable statutes authorize the continued, indefinite
detention of both Petitioners. Because Petitioners have no liberty interest in the right they are asserting, their due process claims fail.
Consequently, there is no constitutional impediment to Petitioners’
continued detention.”138 In making this ruling, the Tenth Circuit rejected the petitioners’ arguments that the Attorney General lacks
statutory authority to detain aliens indefinitely pending the execution
of a final removal order and that, in the alternative, the statute is
ambiguous as to the length of detention permitted and, as such, a
reasonable time limit should be read into the statute.
In Zadvydas v. Underdown, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
addressing the case of Kestutis Zadvydas, reached a similar conclusion supported by a similar argument, holding that “once a resident
alien . . . is—concededly in adherence with procedural and substantive due process—ordered deported and that order becomes final,
the resident alien may claim no greater rights than an excludable
alien in like circumstances.”139 In so holding, the court expressly rejected the petitioner’s argument that even after deportation orders
have been finalized, resident aliens are entitled to a greater degree of
substantive due process protection than excludable aliens. The court
also rejected Zadvydas’ contention that his detention amounted to
nothing more than punishment without trial in contravention of his
right to substantive due process and his liberty interest in being free
from physical confinement. In sum, both of these decisions stand for
the proposition that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) permits the indefinite
detention of deportable aliens, and that such detention, though possibly indefinite, does not result in a violation of an alien’s constitutional right to substantive due process.
3. Section 1231(a)(6) does not permit indefinite detention of aliens
Two courts, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Eastern
District of California, have applied the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance and held that the language of § 1231(a)(6) does not even
permit the indefinite detention of unwanted aliens. The doctrine of
constitutional avoidance, in brief, requires that courts “interpret
137. Id. at 1059.
138. Id. at 1060.
139. Underdown, 185 F.3d at 285.
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statutes in a manner that avoids deciding substantial constitutional
questions.”140
The first court to invoke the doctrine of constitutional avoidance
in a § 1231(a)(6) context was the Eastern District of California in
Sok v. INS.141 The court that “[w]here an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems,
the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless
such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” The
Sok court then held that “[c]onstruing § 1231(a)(6) as vesting the
Attorney General with the authority to detain deportable aliens beyond the removal period with no fixed time limitations would raise a
serious constitutional question.”142 The court eventually held that “a
literal reading of § 1231(a)(6) does not expressly vest the Attorney
General with unlimited power to detain.”143
Six months later, in Ma v. Reno, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly decided that § 1231(a)(6) does not permit indefinite
detention of deportable aliens. In doing so, the Ma court employed
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, stressing the importance of
construing a statute in a manner that will avoid raising constitutional
problems “so long as the saving construction is not ‘plainly contrary
to the intent of Congress.’”144 The court wrote:
We hold that Congress did not grant the INS authority to detain
indefinitely aliens who . . . have entered the United States and cannot be removed to their native land pursuant to a repatriation
agreement. To the contrary, we construe the statute as providing
the INS with authority to detain aliens only for a reasonable time
beyond the statutory removal period. In cases in which the alien
has already entered the United States and there is no reasonable
likelihood that a foreign government will accept the alien’s return
in the reasonably foreseeable future, we conclude that the statute

140. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of L.A., 331 U.S. 549 (1947); United States v. Jin Fuey Moy,
241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916). For a scholarly discussion on the basics of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, see Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV.
1003 (1994).
141. 67 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
142. Id. at 1168 (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 1169.
144. 208 F.3d at 827 (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78
(1994)).
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does not permit the Attorney General to hold the alien beyond the
statutory removal period. Rather, the alien must be released subject
to the supervisory authority provided in the statute.145

As the Ma court invoked the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, it
did not address the issues of substantive or procedural due process as
they relate to the detention of aliens under § 1231(a)(6). In sum,
these two courts disagreed with a number of other federal tribunals
and held that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) does not permit the indefinite
detention of aliens ordered deported.
B. Other Issues Raised in These Cases
In addition to the issues of whether the Attorney General has
statutory authority to detain deportable aliens indefinitely pending
deportation and whether that prolonged detention violates the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, three other significant issues are
raised in the aforementioned cases: (1) whether deportable aliens
have greater rights than excludable aliens; (2) whether it is fair to require the deportable alien to bear the burden of proving that he or
she is not a danger to the community or a flight risk before release
into the community to await deportation may be effected; and (3)
whether the indefinite detention of deportable aliens violates international law.146
1. Do deportable aliens have greater rights than excludable aliens?
The two circuit courts that held that indefinite detention of a
deportable alien is not a violation of his constitutional rights did so
because, in the view of those courts, “once a resident alien . . . [is]
ordered deported and that order becomes final, the resident alien

145. Id. at 821–22. In its opinion, the Ma court stated that the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance has been employed in immigration contexts in the past, giving as examples the following cases: United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 199 (1957) (reading a limitation into
a statute which authorized the INS to demand information from deportable aliens—the limitation held that aliens did not have to answer questions that were not relevant to a legitimate
governmental purpose); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854–56 (1985) (avoiding a constitutional question by holding that an immigration parole regulation does not permit race-based
discrimination); Romero v. INS, 39 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (reading a limitation into a statute such that an alien who refused to answer questions unrelated to her visa status was protected from deportation).
146. A few cases have also wrestled with whether or not Congress’s plenary power extends to post-deportation order detention. See infra note 149.
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may claim no greater rights than an excludable alien in like circumstances.”147
In Underdown, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals gave the following justification for its decision that deportable aliens have no
more rights than excludable aliens:
In the [case of an alien ordered deported because of the commission of a crime], the national interest in effectuating deportation is
identical regardless of whether the alien was once resident or excludable. When a former resident alien is—with the adequate and
unchallenged procedural due process to which his assertion of a
right to remain in this country entitles him—finally ordered deported, the decision has irrevocably been made to expel him from
the national community. Nothing remains but to effectuate this decision. The need to expel such an alien is identical, from a national
sovereignty perspective, to the need to remove an excludable alien
who has been finally and properly ordered returned to his country
of origin. The fact that deportation cannot be immediately effectuated would not seem to recreate a distinction in the government’s
interest regarding excludable aliens and resident aliens.148

Other courts, such as Phan, have strongly disagreed. These courts
have held that a resident alien’s right to substantive due process is
not extinguished by a final deportation order. It is retained until actual physical expulsion is effected.149
2. Is it fair to put the burden of proof on the alien?
Under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, an alien held past the ninety-day removal period can gain a release if he or she, to the satisfaction of the
district directors, “demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence
that the release would not pose a danger to the community or a significant flight risk.”150 Courts differ on their views toward the fairness
of this procedure—i.e., the fairness of placing the burden of proof on
the alien to demonstrate that his or her release will not pose a danger
147. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 285 (5th Cir. 1999).
148. Id. at 296.
149. Related to this argument is another raised by the courts: whether the plenary power
of Congress in the immigration realm extends to post-deportation order detention. Some
courts, such as Zadvydas v. Underdown, clearly believe that it does. See 185 F.3d at 294. At
least one judge—Justice Brorby of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals—disagrees, as evidenced by his dissent in Ho v. Greene. See 204 F.3d 1045, 1062 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000).
150. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (2000).
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to the community or a significant risk of flight. For example, in
Nguyen v. Fasano,151 the court stated:
Although there may be other considerations warranting continued
detention if a deportation is realistic, the issue here is who bears
what burden if deportation is not realistic. Where effecting removal
is frustrated to such an extent, the petitioner should presumptively
be released unless the government can show why he or she should
not be released. In such a case, the government should bear the
burden of showing that achieving its remaining interests, for example, preventing flight and protecting the community, are not excessive in relation to the restriction of Petitioners’ liberty.152

Other courts, however, in cases such as Zadvydas v. Underdown,
Zadvydas v. Caplinger,153 and Sengchanh v. Lanier,154 though not expressly stating that it is fair to place the burden of proof on the alien,
have proceeded to analyze deportation cases under the assumption
that there is no unfairness in 8 C.F.R. § 241.4.
3. Does indefinite detention violate international law?
In Ma, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of the detention of
criminal deportable aliens from the point of view of international
law, arguing that holding aliens indefinitely is a violation of that law.
The court first addressed the relationship between Congressional
legislation and international law when it wrote:
In interpreting the statute to include a reasonable time limitation,
we are also influenced by amicus curiae Human Rights Watch’s argument that we should apply the well-established Charming Betsy
rule of statutory construction which requires that we generally construe Congressional legislation to avoid violating international law.
We have reaffirmed this rule on several occasions. In United States
v. Thomas, we explained that we adhere to this principle “out of respect for other nations.”155

The court next pointed out that international law generally prohibits indefinite detention when it stated: “We recently recognized
151. 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2000).
152. Id. at 1111.
153. 986 F. Supp. 1011 (E.D. La. 1997).
154. 89 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
155. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 829–30 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v.
Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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that ‘a clear international prohibition’ exists against prolonged and
arbitrary detention. Furthermore, Article 9 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which the
United States has ratified, provides that ‘no one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest and detention.’”156 Finally, the Ma court stated that
in the case of deportable criminal aliens, construing the statute in a
way that permits indefinite detention of these aliens likely violates
the international prohibition on “prolonged and arbitrary detention.” It wrote:
In the present case, construing the statute to authorize the indefinite detention of removable aliens might violate international law.
In Martinez, we expressed our approval of a district court decision
in this circuit holding that “individuals imprisoned for years without being charged were arbitrarily detained” in violation of international law. Given the strength of the rule of international law, our
construction of the statute renders it consistent with the Charming
Betsy rule.157

Thus, the court urged, international law prohibits the indefinite detention of aliens such as Kim Ho Ma and Kestutis Zadvydas.
IV. ANALYSIS
Under the current state of the law, it is unclear which of the
above views on the indefinite detention of deportable aliens is the
most correct. Indeed, courts on all sides of the issue have freely admitted that there is no strong Supreme Court authority that directly
supports their views.158 While a clear answer will not be available until the Supreme Court addresses the issue, a look at the law currently
in existence demonstrates that the view set forth by Zadvydas v. Underdown and Ho v. Greene is the proper view. To put it another way,
a look at the law as outlined by Congress and the Supreme Court fa-

156. Id. at 829 (quoting Martinez v. Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1998);
International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, opened for signature, Dec. 19, 1966, 99
U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976, at Art. 9(1)) (footnote omitted).
157. Id. (quoting Martinez, 141 F.3d at 1384).
158. For example, after addressing a string of Supreme Court cases regarding the right of
the United States to deport aliens, the Zadvydas v. Underdown court offered a lack of authority
as support for its holding: “Nothing in these cases suggests that a resident alien has a broadly
privileged constitutional status relative to excludable aliens, or is constitutionally entitled to
more favorable treatment when both the right asserted and the governmental interest are identical to those in the parallel case of an excludable alien.” 185 F.3d 279, 295 (5th Cir. 1999).
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vors the view that there is no violation of the Fifth Amendment
when deportable aliens are detained pending deportation past the
statutory ninety-day removal period, even when that period of detention appears to be unlikely to end in the near future.
Specifically, there is support in the law for the proposition that
deportable aliens have no greater due process rights than those excludable aliens who the Supreme Court says can be detained indefinitely. Additionally, allowing the release of deportable aliens into the
United States is a direct violation of federal constitutional law. Finally, international law does not require the release of these aliens,
and the interim procedures promulgated by the INS in August of
1999 provide more than enough substantive and procedural due
process protections to satisfy the established standards. On these
grounds, a conclusion that deportable aliens can be held well past
the ninety-day removal period is constitutionally sound.
A. The Government’s Interests in Detaining a Deportable Alien Are
the Same as Those in Detaining an Excludable Alien
Though some courts disagree that after an order of deportation
has been entered the rights and interests of deportable aliens are the
same as those belonging to excludable aliens, it is apparent that, under the law, the rights of these respective groups of aliens are in fact
the same. It is also apparent that once a deportation order is entered,
the government’s interest in pre-deportation detention of a deportable alien is the same interest that it has in the detention of an excludable alien. Consequently, it is unreasonable to assume that the
same government interest will require different results when applied
to excludable and deportable aliens who enjoy the same constitutional rights.
Before deportation, a resident alien has a presumptive right to be
at large within the borders of the United States. An excludable alien,
on the other hand, has no such right or expectation, only a hope of
entering the borders of the nation. An order of deportation, however, strips a resident alien of the right to be at large within the
United States.159 Once a deportation order has been entered, then,

159. This proposition is supported by statutory and case law. For instance, 8 C.F.R.
§ 1.1(p) states:
The term lawfully admitted for permanent residence means the status of having been
lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an
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with respect to the right to enter or remain in the United States, the
deportable alien has no greater right or claim to entry than an excludable alien ordered removed. For example, when Kim Ho Ma became a resident alien, he gained the rights enjoyed by all resident
aliens, namely the right to both procedural and substantive due
process under the Fifth Amendment, as well as the right to be free
within the borders of the United States. When the government initiated deportation proceedings against him, Ma was guaranteed due
process protections during those proceedings, and there is no contention that these rights were violated. Once the deportation order
was entered, however, Ma lost the right to be free within the United
States, and as such was similar to an excludable alien ordered excluded from the United States. At that point, neither Ma nor an excludable alien had any right to remain within the borders of the
United States.
Additionally, once an order of deportation has been entered, the
government’s interest in removing the individual from the United
States is the same, regardless of whether the alien is deportable or
excludable. As one court put it:
In the circumstances presented here, the national interest in effectuating deportation is identical regardless of whether the alien was
once resident or excludable. When a former resident alien is—with
the adequate and unchallenged procedural due process to which his
assertion of a right to remain in this country entitles him—finally
ordered deported, the decision has irrevocably been made to expel
him from the national community. Nothing remains but to effectuate this decision. The need to expel such an alien is identical, from
a national sovereignty perspective, to the need to remove an excludable alien who has been finally and properly ordered returned
to his country of origin. . . . Whether the party to be deported is an
excludable or a former resident, the United States has properly
made its decision and earnestly wishes—if for no other reason than
to save the cost of detention—to deport the detainee.160

immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having
changed. Such status terminates upon entry of a final administrative order of exclusion
or deportation.
(second emphasis added). In the case of aliens such as Zadvydas and Ma, 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(p)
means that status as a resident alien disappears upon the entry of an order of deportation.
160. Underdown, 185 F.3d at 296 (citation omitted).
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The United States Supreme Court expressed a similar sentiment
when it wrote that the “power to exclude aliens and the power to
expel them rest upon one foundation, are derived from one source,
are supported by the same reasons, and are in truth but parts of one
and the same power.”161 In this context, the government’s interests
include protecting the nation from recidivism and preventing aliens
from absconding, as well as ending an ongoing violation of immigration laws.162 This is true whether the alien is being held as excludable
or deportable.
In sum, the government’s interest in both deportation and exclusion contexts is the protection of United States citizens and efficient
administration of United States immigration laws, both of which are
legitimate, narrowly tailored interests that permit detention of aliens.
Similarly, excludable and deportable aliens stand in the same position—both lack a right to be free within the borders of the United
States and enjoy only a general right to be free from detention. The
United States Supreme Court has decided that those lacking a right
to be free within the United States can be detained when they present a danger to the community or a risk of flight,163 meaning that
detaining these individuals, whether deportable or excludable, is
permissible.
In the cases presented above, some aliens have argued that the
right they are trying to assert is not the right to be free in the United
States, but the right to be free from detention. In the context in
which the aliens are seeking release, however, this is a distinction
without a difference. To release the aliens from detention is to release them back into the United States—as they, by the very nature
of their undeportable status, cannot be released elsewhere—which is
a violation of federal law.164 Regardless, once the deportation order is
entered, the aliens are left in identical positions, and the right to deprive them of physical liberty is identical. As Part II(D)(3) of this
Comment indicates, the law is clear that, in this situation, detention
is permissible.

161.
162.
163.
164.
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A number of courts have attacked the above reasoning, set forth
primarily in Underdown, as unsound.165 However, the defenses that
they give for doing so are as suspect as they claim the Underdown
reasoning to be. For example, in Nguyen v. Fasano,166 the Southern
District of California wrote:
This court is not persuaded that excludable and deportable aliens
should be treated identically. “Once an alien gains admission to our
country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent
residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly.” For example, an alien being deported has several rights that an alien being
excluded does not, including designating the country of deportation, the possibility of departing voluntarily, and the ability to seek
suspension of deportation. The reason excludable aliens do not enjoy most constitutional rights is the “entry fiction”: “because excludable aliens are deemed under the entry doctrine not to be present on United States territory, a holding that they have no
substantive right to be free from immigration detention reasonably
follows.” Permanent resident aliens, on the other hand, have already been admitted to the country and are therefore “present on
United States territory.” This court is not persuaded by the Fifth
Circuit’s conclusion in Zadvydas that a final order of deportation
erases any rights a permanent resident alien previously possessed.
“[G]iven that resident aliens have acknowledged constitutional
rights, we cannot make those rights vanish by the legal expedient of
a final order of deportation.”167

While the Nguyen court makes some good points, its argument is
ultimately untenable. For example, one of the Nguyen court’s main
supports for its argument that deportable aliens have rights different
from those belonging to excludable aliens is the fact that, in its view,
“an alien being deported has several rights that an alien being excluded does not, including designating the country of deportation,
the possibility of departing voluntarily, and the ability to seek suspension of deportation.” However, a close look at the United States
165. The most oft-cited pro-release decision, Phan, did not address the issue in any significant detail, but simply assumed that the rights of deportable aliens to due process protection continued with them until actual physical deportation was effected. The court stated: “No
authority supports the government’s position that aliens somehow ‘assimilate’ to excludable
status once they have been ordered deported, thereby relinquishing their constitutional
rights.” Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
166. 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2000).
167. Id. at 1109–10 (citations omitted).
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Code shows that this is, to some degree, a false premise. To begin
with, the Nguyen court broadly states that deportable aliens have the
right to depart voluntarily. This is true, but not as true as the court
intimates. For instance, under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (a)(1), not all deportable aliens can voluntarily depart. That section states:
The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily to depart the
United States at the alien’s own expense under this subsection, in
lieu of being subject to proceedings under section 1229a of this title or prior to the completion of such proceedings, if the
alien is not deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) or section
1227(a)(4)(B) of this title.168

For the purposes of this Comment, it is important to note that
those aliens who cannot voluntarily depart, namely aliens deportable
under §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 1227(a)(4)(B), are many of the
same aliens that the Attorney General is authorized to hold past the
ninety-day removal period.169 Thus, the court is incorrect when it intimates that all of the aliens being held past the ninety-day period
have rights to voluntary departure that excludable aliens do not. Additionally, while excludable aliens do not have the right to “voluntary departure,” § 1229c (a)(4) plainly states that “[n]othing in this
paragraph shall be construed as preventing [an excludable] alien
from withdrawing [his or her] application for admission in accordance with section 1225(a)(4) of this title.”170 Thus, the practical effect of the code is that at least some excludable aliens do have the
right to voluntarily cease efforts to enter the United States, and
thereby depart the country voluntarily. These excludable aliens can
withdraw their application and physically return to their countries of
origin. Deportable aliens can agree not to remain in the United
States and physically return to their countries of origin. Either way,
the decision to not remain in the United States is voluntary, meaning
from a practical standpoint, both groups of aliens enjoy the same
right to “voluntary departure.” It is clear, then, that the Nguyen
court was not wholly correct when it made the broad assertion that
deportable aliens have the right to depart voluntarily when excludable aliens do not.
168. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
169. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) permits, at the discretion of the Attorney General, the continued detention of aliens “removable under section[s] . . . 1227(a)(2), [and] 1227(a)(4).”
170. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (a)(4).
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The Nguyen court also premises its holding that excludable and
deportable aliens do not share the same rights on the fact that, in its
view, deportable aliens have the right to designate the country to
which they will be deported while excludable aliens do not. While
this is true, it is well established that a deportable alien does not have
a right to be deported to the country of his choice or not be deported at all. As the case of Kestutis Zadvydas demonstrates, the
United States will seek to deport an alien to any country, within reason, that will take him or her.171 The fact that an alien wants to be
deported to Germany, for example, does not mean that deportation
to Lithuania is precluded when Germany refuses to take the alien in
question. Additionally, it is important to note that the right to record a non-binding preference for which country an alien will be deported to is a far cry from the fundamental liberty interests protected
by the Fifth Amendment. The fact that an alien has been given the
right to voice an opinion as to where he or she would like to end up
is not so intertwined with due process that the second necessarily accompanies the first. Again, the Nguyen court’s reasoning—and basis
for its decision that detaining an alien well past the removal period is
unconstitutional—is seriously flawed.
In sum, there is simply no convincing authority to support the
proposition that a deportable alien retains the full panoply or rights
he or she enjoyed prior to the order after a finalized order of deportation is entered; in fact, there is strong authority to support a theory
that the opposite is true. Again, this situation may always be unclear
until it is addressed directly by the Supreme Court, but the weight of
existing authority shows that it is reasonable to find that deportable
aliens stand in the same position as excludable aliens, and just as reasonable to conclude that, like excludable aliens, deportable aliens can
be held in INS custody for prolonged periods of time.
B. To Release Deportable Aliens into the United States Makes a
Mockery of the Constitution and Creates a Violation of Federal Law
To release deportable aliens back into the community when deportation is not possible within the ninety-day removal period also
makes a mockery of the deportation process, the United States’ immigration laws and procedure, and ultimately the Constitution of the
171. In the case of Zadvydas, the INS has looked to at least four different nations as possible destinations for Zadvydas.

1589

6DIN-FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/9/00 1:39 PM

[2000

United States. For example, when an alien is ordered deported, he or
she loses the right to be at large within the borders of the United
States. However, if that alien is released from prison and allowed
back into the community until a deportation that may never occur is
effected, he or she “will be awarded the very right denied them as a
result of the final orders of removal.”172 Such a result would, for all
intents and purposes, make ineffective the final order of removal.
The same would also force the United States to “violate its national
sovereignty”173 and would, at first in theory but later in practice,
cause the United States to lose control of its right to exclude and ultimately the right to control its borders.174
Furthermore, to release deportable aliens back into the community results in a direct violation of the law as established by the Supreme Court. In INS v. Lopez-Mendez,175 the United States Supreme
Court held that “[t]he purpose of deportation is not to punish past
transgressions but rather to put an end to a continuing violation of
the immigration laws.”176 By this statement the Court means that an
alien ordered deported violates United States immigration laws by
remaining in the United States. The Court later reaffirmed this position in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee,177 in
which it held that “in all cases, deportation is necessary in order to
bring to an end an ongoing violation of United States law.”178 The
release of deportable aliens into the borders of the United States, after they have been ordered deported, then, “is thus a continuing violation of the immigration laws.”179
Neither the violation of federal law nor the invalidating of an order of deportation is desirable or supportive of Congress’s constitutional right to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization. . .throughout the United States.”180 Indeed, to release aliens
who have been ordered deported back into the United States effec172. Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1058 (10th Cir. 2000).
173. Villafuerte v. INS, 71 F. Supp. 2d 573, 576 (W.D. La. 1999) (citing Gisbert v.
United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1447 (5th Cir. 1993)).
174. See Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 975 (11th Cir. 1984), aff’d 472 U.S. 846
(1985).
175. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
176. Id. at 1039.
177. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
178. Id. at 491.
179. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 297 (5th Cir. 1999).
180. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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tively denies Congress the right to exclude unwanted aliens, and
does so in contravention of Article I of the Constitution.181
C. International Law Does Not Require the Release of Deportable
Aliens
As the Ma court explained, international law generally prohibits
the prolonged detention of deportable aliens such as Zadvydas and
Ma. While the United States does generally seek to abide by international law, with respect to the interpretation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6), international law, contrary to the Ma court’s thinking,
has no controlling weight and, in fact, does not even apply.
In Gisbert v. United States Attorney General,182 a case involving
the prolonged detention of an excludable alien, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed the applicability of international law to
the detention of aliens unwanted in the United States. The court
wrote:
Public international law has been incorporated into the common
law of the United States, and we are thus bound to construe the
federal common law, to the extent reasonably possible, to avoid
violating principles of public international law. Public international
law controls, however, only “where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision . . . .”183

Other decisions, including decisions of the United States Supreme
Court and, interestingly enough, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals—the court that stated in Ma that international law dictates a
ruling against continued detention—support and accept this principle of executive and legislative priority.184
181. Some aliens have argued that the fact that the Attorney General has discretion to
release them from detention when it is determined that they are no longer a danger or a risk of
flight necessarily gives them a liberty interest in being free within the United States. As the Ho
court pointed out in a footnote, there is no clear authority stating that such a situation creates
a liberty interest. See Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1060 n.9 (10th Cir. 2000). In support of
this proposition, the Ho court references Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983),
which held that no liberty interest was created by a statute that allowed a decision-maker to
deny requested relief with unfettered discretion.
182. 988 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir. 1993).
183. Id. at 1447 (quoting Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986)
(emphasis added).
184. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Barrera-Echavarria v.
Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450–51 (9th Cir. 1995); Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in
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As was the case in Gisbert, the detention of deportable aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) involves federal executive, legislative, and
judicial decisions that supersede principles of international law. The
provisions of § 1231(a)(6) granting the Attorney General the right
to detain certain aliens past the ninety-day removal period involved a
decision by the legislative branch of the federal government to permit such detention. Further, the Attorney General’s actions in drafting and following the guidelines found in 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 to effectuate this detention under the statute involve decisions of the
executive branch.185 On these grounds the aforementioned section of
Gisbert holds that international law, while persuasive, is not mandatory precedent in this case, nor does it require courts to refuse to follow the law as set forth by Congress.
D. The August 6, 1999, Interim Procedures Protect the Rights of
Deportable Aliens to the Degree that Detention Does Not Offend Due
Process
Though, as this Comment argues, the continued detention of
deportable aliens past the ninety-day removal period does not result
in a violation of an alien’s right to due process, the interim procedures promulgated by the INS on August 6, 1999, only solidify the
INS’s right to detain such aliens without violating the Fifth Amendment. In Phan, the court expressed concerns regarding the process
of determining when a deportable alien should be released into the
community pending deportation. It wrote:
We have . . . concerns about the quality of the review afforded by
the INS to the petitioners. Indeed, our review of the record confirms that the INS does not meaningfully and impartially review the
petitioners’ custody status. The absence of any individualized assessment or consideration of the petitioners’ situations in light of
Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941
F.2d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 1991); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453–55 (11th Cir.
1986).
185. Again, 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 states: “The district director may continue in custody any
alien . . . removable under section 237 (a)(1)(c), 237 (a)(2), or 237 (a)(4) of the Act, or who
presents a significant risk of noncompliance with the order of removal, beyond the removal
period, as necessary, until removal from the United States.” The wording of this section is
clear, and cannot be interpreted in a way that would not give the District Director the discretion of holding an alien beyond the end of the removal period. Thus, a decision of the executive branch has gone against a rule of international law, and has therefore made the Charming
Betsy rule referred to by the Ma court inapplicable to this case.
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the pertinent factors set forth in the regulations violates their procedural due process rights. At a minimum, each petitioner is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing before an immigration judge at
which he or she can present evidence to support release pending
deportation. The immigration judge must actually consider the factors set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and explain how they apply to
each petitioner’s unique circumstances. Petitioners also must be
able to appeal any adverse denial of a release request to the BIA.186

Ultimately the court concluded that without the enumerated
protections, the prolonged detention of unwanted aliens is unconstitutional on due process grounds. The interim procedures, released
just one month after the publication of the Phan decision, address
these concerns and alleviate them by providing the aliens with more
substantive and procedural due process protections than they
previously enjoyed, enough protections to make continued detention
not unconstitutional.187
One of the Phan court’s major concerns involved the absence of
an individualized assessment of a petitioner alien’s individual situation. The interim procedures address this concern in a number of
ways. First, Interim Procedure (1) states that “the District Director
will continue to conduct a custody review of administratively final
order removal cases before the ninety-day removal period . . . expires.”188 Interim Procedure (4) further provides that, after the expiration of the ninety-day removal period, the District Director shall
hold an additional review in which “an interview [with the individual
alien] is mandatory and the District Director’s preliminary decision
will be subject to Headquarters review.”189 Thus, this requires that
the alien be provided with at least two more instances of personal review than they previously had, including face-to-face contact with a
reviewer whose decision can be appealed. Moreover, after the first
post-ninety-day interview, “custody reviews [are to be] conducted
every six months,”190 meaning that individualized assessment may
continue as long as detention continues.
Another of the Phan court’s concerns addressed the alien’s ability to present evidence to support his or her release from detention
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
See supra note 120 for the full text of the procedures.
Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 400 app. (3d Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id.
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pending deportation. The interim procedures also address this concern. Specifically, Interim Procedure (3) states that “the alien will be
provided the opportunity to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that he is not a threat to the community and is likely to
comply with the removal order.”191 Additionally, with respect to the
semi-annual reviews following the ninety-day removal period, Interim Procedure (5) states that, when notified of each review, “[t]he
alien must be advised that he may submit any information relevant to
support his request for release from detention.”192 Thus, there are no
restrictions in the interim procedures to an alien’s ability to present
evidence favorable to himself or herself.
Additionally, the Phan court also felt that a reviewing body
should specifically “consider the factors set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 241.4
and explain how they apply to each petitioner’s unique circumstances.”193 Interim Procedure (1) specifically states that review
should be conducted “[p]ursuant to the provisions of 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.4,”194 and Interim Procedure (7) states that any “decision to
detain will clearly delineate the factors presented by the alien in support of his release, and the reasons for the District Director’s decision.”195 This third concern, then, is also alleviated by the interim
procedures.
Finally, with respect to overall fairness toward the alien, the interim procedures are more than adequate to allow the INS to detain
aliens pending deportation without violating the sanctimonious rules
of due process, even if that detention appears to be indefinite. Interim Procedure (8), for example, provides that “the District Director’s determination that the alien should be detained is to be regarded as only preliminary,”196 as at least two more INS officials
must approve the decision before detention can continue. In the case
of disagreement, an entire panel will examine the issue. Clearly, this
procedure provides for more than a “summary review by an INS officer”197 of a particular alien’s situation. Additionally, the interim procedures provide for some forgiveness of past transgressions, as Pro191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
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cedure (6) states that an alien’s criminal history “does not create a
presumption in favor of continued detention.”198 In sum, the interim
procedures are more than fair to those aliens detained past the removal period and are comprehensive enough to allow the INS to determine which aliens it will be safe to release.
In complying with the concerns of Phan and making the detention process much more fair to the aliens, the interim procedures
provide criminal aliens detained past the ninety-day removal period
with greater procedural and substantive due process protections than
ever before. This being the case, to release dangerous and recidivist
aliens would be to subject the citizens and community of the United
States to possible danger when doing so is unnecessary.
V. CONCLUSION
Until the United States Supreme Court undertakes to address
the issues presented by these alien deportation cases, the law will
continue to be unclear and the courts split. When the Court finally
does address the issue, however, it will likely hold that the indefinite
detention of deportable aliens is constitutional. The interim procedures announced by the INS on August 6, 1999, clearly address and
alleviate the concerns regarding due process that have been expressed
by Phan and other courts. These procedures provide deportable
aliens who have been detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) with
more detailed protections than they enjoyed before the announcement of the procedures. Moreover, the fact that resident aliens ordered deported enjoy no more rights than excludable aliens and in
fact stand in the same shoes as excludable aliens, further supports the
view that pre-deportation detention is constitutional.
Additionally, as the Fifth Circuit put it in Underdown, the “presence [of aliens ordered deported] in this country is . . . a continuing
violation of the immigration laws.”199 Further, as the Tenth Circuit
held, “[i]f their . . . petitions are granted, [the aliens ordered deported] will be awarded the very right denied them as a result of the
final orders of removal, i.e., the right to be at large in the United
States.”200 Requiring the INS to release criminal aliens whose deportation is unlikely strips the government of its constitutionally198. Chi Thon Ngo, 192 F.3d at 401.
199. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 297 (5th Cir. 1999).
200. Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1058 (10th Cir. 2000).
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guaranteed power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . throughout the United States,”201 because the government
is forced to allow aliens that it wants to exclude to run free, which in
turn results in “our losing control over our borders.”202 While considering the due process rights of aliens is important, it is clear that
in evaluating deportation procedures, a court’s balancing of factors
“must weigh heavily in the balance that control over matters of immigration is a sovereign prerogative.”203 The right of the government
to effectuate its constitutionally guaranteed powers, then, must take
precedent over a deportable alien’s right to be free.
In conclusion, it is not the purpose of this Comment to argue
that all aliens held detained beyond the ninety-day removal period
are inherently evil criminals or are more than likely to commit additional crimes upon their release. Nor is it the purpose of this Comment to argue that all aliens detainable beyond the removal period
should absolutely be detained, forever if possible. To put it simply,
there are a few aliens who, for the good of the nation, need to be detained, and detention should be available in the case of these aliens.
To implement the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and hold that
there is no detention past the removal period would be to allow
these individuals to be set free to the detriment of the nation and in
violation of our immigration laws. Similarly, to hold as the Phan
court did, that prolonged detention is unconstitutional, will lead to
an identical result. Prolonged and possibly indefinite detention needs
to be an option in order for the INS and the rest of the government
to protect the nation, uphold the law, and preserve the powers
granted to Congress by the Constitution. Only under such a regime
can Congressional power “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . throughout the United States.”204
Daniel R. Dinger

201.
202.
203.
204.
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